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Eighteen authors have contributed to this huge review of the Philosophy of
science in Italy during the 20th century. Their contributions cover the origins
of modern philosophy of science at the turn of the 19 th to the 20th century, the
philosophy of science during the first half of the 20th c. (until 2nd World war),
the 'new philosophy of science' that arose after the war, and contemporary
trends in the field. All this is framed between a critical Introduction by AGAZZI
himself and an Appendix containing the list of reviews and main publications,
as well as names of Journals as produced in Italy, analytically and critically
presented.
Subject-matters as positivism and pragmatisim, foundation of mathematics,
intuitionism, logistic and artificial languages, idealism, the interpretation of
relativity theory, quantum physics, the particular period of transition and
renewal lasting from the First till the Second world war, neo-positivism,
Marxist tendencies, history versus philosophy of science, the special philoso-
phies of mathematics and of physics, of cybernetics and systems, of social
science, objectualistic tendencies, and Popperianism in recent years, are dealt
with. The many '-isms' included in that list are typical of what has been done
and how it has been done in all these hundred years in Italy.
Indeed, by looking merely at the title of the book, a naive reader might
expect to find a series of reports on the special contributions made by Italian
savants and thinkers to the philosophy of science, summarizing their works
and listing their main results and advances. If this were the sole expectation of
the reader, he would be disappointed. For, very little of that is explicitly present
in the book.
Surely, to begin with, representatives of the older generation active in the
field of philosophy of science like the author of the present review have of
course in the late twenties and the thirties of this century heard of names like
those of PEANO, ENRIQUES, FANTAPPIE and others in reference with what was
then described as the Crisis of foundation of mathematics, and they had
eventually read and studied their papers and books. Therefore they might
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think that e.g. the main results attained by such authors would be described
and judged according to their importance in the light of the present situation
fifty years or more later. Or one might wish to know what are the specific
contributions of more recent authors to the progress of the philosophy of the
various specific sciences . . . However, little of that constitutes the contents
proper of this big book. Rather, many of the contributions are papers on what
might be called partly the history, partly the critique of the polemics between
schools of thought with special reference to the philosophy of science. Still, for
all that, some contributions are more precisely conceived as a clear
presentation of what scholars have contributed to the clarification of problems
of the philosophy of the various scientific fields.
So the question arises, why the book under review more or less inevitably
presents itself as it does. The reason seems to be found in the very nature of
traditional philosophizing in Italy still very much practised today: Philoso-
phers in that country do for a considerable part live on, and love, philosophical
controversy. This may be both their strength and their weakness. Weakness,
evidently, because if one persists in quarrelling with others about which is the
right stand-point, he will easily miss the train and remain rather unproductive
within the actual disentanglement of specific problematics at hand. Strength,
because it makes the scholars extremely sharp in the art of rhetorics and
argumentation.
This may explain why the development of philosophy in Italy, even in a field
as precisely delimited as the philosophy of science, has consisted in a long and
weary controversy between the -isms, much more so than it has been the case,
especially before the Second world war, in the rest of the Continent. Of course,
such controversies did also take place, e.g. in France, Holland and elsewhere
between extreme tendencies like neo-positivism or intuitionism, but there, the
situation was less polemic and disputatious, for the scholars would prefer to
write matter-of-fact papers.
It may also be due to two circumstances. One is that, during the 18th and
19th centuries, Italian philosophy, especially as it was concerned with the
advance of the sciences, had declined. Hence, on the turn between the 19th
and the 20th century, when not only professional philosophers but also and
advantageously scholars in the specific fields—especially mathematicians and
physicists—began to write on the philosophy of science (mainly in France and
Germany), this very kind of philosophy developed on a scene where
standpoints soon began to oppose one another. And since controversy seems to
be a favourite occupation among Italians, this particular kind of philosophiz-
ing developed. It was nevertheless luck that mathematicians of rank were
among the protagonists (PEANO and others have already been mentioned and a
number of others could be named. The only name still more often quoted in the
book, yet for a more recent period, is that of LUDOVICO GEYMONIAT, also very
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much interested in mathamtics, a 'neo-illuministic libertarian' as he is called
at one place in the book).
Another circumstance may reside in the fact that philosophy, generally
speaking, was, until rather late in the 20th century, very much dominated in
Italy by two personalities of high status: CROCE and GENTILE, who were
outstanding protagonists of an idealism which not simply combatted scientism
and positivism, but claimed to explain science as a reductive and pragmatic
type of cognitive activity. For CROCE, science was outside philosophy. Backed
by historicism, idealism in Italy has been qualitatively and quantitatively very
much represented until our day, but it has also gone through an evolution as
regards the consideration of science, since Guzzo for instance insisted upon the
humanistic value of the sciences, or SPIRITO attributed to them an active role in
the regeneration of philosophy.
After the last war, everything has changed in the whole world. Also in Italy,
one had to adapt philosophic reflection to a totally new cultural, political and
epistemological situation. The strongest impulse came from L. GEYMONIAT,
however, as late as the sixties. Nevertheless, in the thirties and forties already,
a scientific phenomenon had started in Italy after many decades of relative
unproductivity and stagnation: a school of physics emerged of great quality
and intense activity, mostly concentrated on theoretical quantum physics and
mainly situated at Rome, yet also with ramifications elsewhere and in the
other fields of that science (relativity theory, astrophysics and the like). The
central figure there has been ENRICO FERMI. Even though he cannot be said to
have been a 'philosopher of physics' in the proper sense himself, this
emergence of physics which he symbolized has lately been accompanied by the
appearance of a number of physicists (also astronomers etc.) interested in, and
working specifically on problems of the philosophy of physics, even more so
than it is the case in other countries of comparable size. This has some analogy
with what had happened in the early years of the century with reference to
mathematics. For, if today there is, so to speak, no problem (or 'crisis') of the
foundation of mathematics left, there is—since the beginning of the BOHR-
EINSTEIN controversy—still with us, a problem (or 'crisis') of the foundation of
(theoretical) physics. In contradistinction with older days, however, Italian
scholars today refrain in that respect from mere controversies and are mainly
concerned with matter-of-fact questions.
Another field, whose importance has been recognized and has increased
among Italian scholars recently, is the philosophy of social science and of the
humanities as sciences. There of course, one may expect adepts of Marxism
and the like (GRAMSCI and others) to be particularly active. Where this is the
case, however, they are of the traditional disputatious kind rather than true to
the real authentic problematics.
The relationship between the so-called empirical sciences and metaphysics
418 Review
is being approached nowadays in a way rather free from prejudices, as is
known to exist, e.g. within analytical and similar schools abroad. This
problematic may become more and more important in the coming decades.
Here, AGAZZI himself is contributing important material, especially because he
is trained not only in traditional philosophy, but also in formal logic and the
history of the (exact) sciences. His impact on the consideration of science versus
ethics is also of considerable bearing for the future.
It appears preferable to refrain from quoting a lot of names, for there are so
many cited in the book, that a choice might sound as uttering a kind of
judgement of value and this is not possible to do among living philosophers. If
at the dawn of the century the interest was mostly in the foundation of
mathematics, it also had views on Darwinism and, very specifically yet oddly
as it appears today, on the possibility and the expectation of successfully
constructing artificial languages (there, the friendship between PEANO and the
French mathematician COUTURAT degenerated into an estrangement; in our
days, nobody thinks anymore of the applicability of an artificial world
language, yet there was a time when this was considered a main possibility for
the achievement of universal understanding and peace!).
The book does also give some information on the work done in the field of
history of science, especially the relationship between the history and the
philosophy of science.
The abundance of papers and books published in Italy on the various topics
of the philosophy of science is amazing. Apart from translations of standard
foreign works, many more have been translated from French, English, German
etc. Of course, Italian scholars are ordinarily very good at French as well as at
English or German and would not really need these translations, but the fact
remains and is a proof of the lively interest taken in foreign activity in the field.
They, themselves, write of course mostly in their own language, but quite a few
do also publish—mainly articles—in foreign Reviews and with foreign
Publishing companies. Innumerable publishing companies are spread
throughout Italy; many have epistemological titles on their lists (we quote here
only the most renowned ones: Armando in Rome, Feltrinelli and Angeli in
Milan, II Mulino in Bologna, Cedam in Padua, Bombiani, Boringhieri,
Mondadori, Einaudi, Zanichelli and others). The number of Journals where
papers on the philosophy of science are published is amazing; from the
celebrated Rendiconti di Palermo (and the other Academies of course), the more
famous journals Scientia and Logos, till the most recent Epistemologia, we would
count at least a dozen journals. Some more or less extensive and/or critical
reports have been published—in Italy or abroad—on developments of the
philosophy of science in Italy, especially by FILIASI-CARCANO, SELVAGGI,
SOMENZI, AGAZZI, PERA . . .
The book under review is rather difficult, at places tedious, to read. Several
contributions are written in a cumbrous Italian. The easier ones are mostly
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written by scientists. The old French man of letters BOILEAU said that ce qui se
concoit Men s'enonce clairement. Yet be that as it may, both EDMUND BURKE and
ALBERT SCHWEITZER have drawn the attention of philosophers upon the fact
that the clearer a text, the poorer it is in contents!
